

# Roots of Friendship, Part Six

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## Ping pong diplomacy By Karen Shaw Kerpen

*This is Part Six, and the conclusion, of the Roots of Friendship, which explored the beginnings and growth of the China friendship movement in the United States over the past four decades. This installment includes the founding and work of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association, and its role in this historical process. The series is based on the author's doctoral thesis.*

As a candidate, Richard Nixon predicted new relations between the US and China and as president, Nixon was able to make his own prophecy come true.

Nixon entered office in January 1969, certain that a new policy toward China was an "essential component of foreign policy." His administration had an "obligation to establish contact, define our positions and perhaps move on to a greater understanding" between the two countries.

In April 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers announced that the administration "would be willing to take the initiative to establish more normal relations with Communist China." In July, the State Department validated passports for travel to the PRC and later announced that subsidiary firms of US corporations could trade non-strategic items with China. The Warsaw Talks, moribund because of China's antagonism toward American policy in Indochina, were scheduled to revive in 1970.

Many Americans applauded these steps. Key Congressmen offered a great deal of help. Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield called for better trade relations between the two countries. Oregon's Senator Mark Hatfield called the Nationalists' posture as rulers of all China "an absurd fiction." A September resolution by the Senate declared that recognition of the PRC by the US would not imply "US approval of the form, ideology or policy of that foreign government"—thus negating one of Dulles' cherished beliefs. In November 1969, 39 Representatives and 8 Senators sent Nixon a letter expressing "full support and agreement" with his moves toward China.

Approval came from nongovernmental organizations as well. The League of Women Voters, which had studied US-China policy for three years, announced in favor of negotiations on recognizing the PRC, admitting the PRC to the United Nations,

and ending the trade embargo. The National Committee on US-China Relations, with Cecil Thomas as executive secretary, moved to consolidate support for a new policy toward the PRC. The Committee organized a national convention in March

1969, chaired by Edwin Reischauer, former ambassador to Japan, and A. Doak Barnett, a China expert and chairman of the National Committee. Both thought that the high level of interest shown indicated "the growing belief in the United States that the issues and problems involved in America's China policy deserve far greater attention and discussion than they have received in the past. The planners wanted to offer Nixon suggested foreign policy goals that he could incorporate in his first term plans.

Senator Edward Kennedy gave the major address at the conference, arguing that the US should "make it clear that we regard China as a legitimate power on the mainland, entitled to full participation as an equal member of the world community."

Other speakers supporting changes were: John D. Rockefeller; correspondent, Harrison Salisbury; John K. Fairbank; James Thomson; and Senator Jacob Javits.

The conference and the other work it was doing earned the National Committee the reputation of being the most ambitious and well-informed organization concerned with US-China policy.

In 1970, Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, embarked on a secret endeavor to arrange a visit to China. The Chinese accepted and plans were made in elaborate secrecy, involving clandestine trips to Paris and China, and support from President Yahya Kahn of Pakistan, former President Georges Pompidou of France and President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania.

The most significant breakthroughs occurred in 1971. In April, Zhou Enlai invited the American ping-pong team which had

been competing in Tokyo to visit the PRC after the tournament was over, and the media dubbed the visit evidence of "ping-pong diplomacy." Two American scientists who had visited Hanoi were invited to the PRC in May and 13 Asian scholars from the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) spent three weeks in June touring China.

William Hinton, having finally retrieved his passport from the State Department, accepted Zhou Enlai's long-standing invitation to return to the PRC. He stayed seven months, touring, talking and meeting with leading cadres, including Premier Zhou.

President Nixon announced in July that his trip to China would occur in the spring of 1972. Response was favorable. In the interim between his July announcement and his February trip, several American delegations flew to China. Prominent journalists, anti-war activists and a special delegation from the Black Panthers went to China before Nixon did. After they returned, most spoke, lectured and published articles or books on their findings; curiosity about China was whetted as Americans heard about events and life in a nation hidden from them for so long.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held lengthy hearings in 1971 to consider resolutions to repeal the Formosa Resolution, to urge the US to recognize the PRC and to support admitting the PRC into the United Nations. Senator McGovern called upon the Senate to reject the cold war view that China was an aggressive nation and a threat to the US. Senator Kennedy called for admission of China to the UN as the sole government of China. Senator Church sponsored the resolution to repeal the Formosa Resolution, which the Congress approved. Following the 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers, Fulbright chaired special hearings to discuss the now-public documents detailing US policy toward China in the 1940s. John S. Service, one of the "China hands" purged from the State Department, testified about the evolution of the containment policy.

In essence then, many of the factors and terms Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger were negotiating in secret were being debated publicly by civic organizations and congressmen, and the conclusions everyone reached were similar.

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### Activities after the Shanghai Communique

Shortly after the Communique was signed, the Chinese ping-pong team expressed an interest in visiting the US, as part of the exchanges pledged in the agreement. The secrecy surrounding the Nixon-Kissinger trips had prevented official exchange institutions from being built in time, so the role of host fell to the National Committee on US-China Relations, the only national organization equipped to handle such a job.

Successfully acting as host for this tour assured involvement with later tours and exchanges. The National Committee became host to several cultural, sports and educational exchanges between the US and China and has received government funds to do so. Although Committee members consider the organization a private group, separate from government, it now cooperates with the State Department in arranging exchanges and receives nearly a third of its budget from government agencies. The Communique propelled the Committee into a role it had not foreseen at its inception.

For the USCPFA, the Communique offered different opportunities. Activists felt it was the first step toward normalization, but were unclear as to how the terms would be implemented. The war in Indochina was still being waged and the US had not stopped

sending aid to the Taiwan government nor instructed American firms to change the patterns of investment there. Since the chapters were autonomous, little coordination and no national policy existed.

Building a national organization occupied the members over the next 18 months. At the end of 1972, 21 chapters met, discussed experiences and plans and elected a provisional national steering committee. The establishment of liaison offices between America and the PRC in May 1973 raised hopes that recognition would quickly follow. These hopes were dashed by the investigations linked to the Watergate affair. The USCPFA tried to keep interest in relations high during this lull by public education and tours to China.

The National USCPFA was formed in the fall of 1974, when 400 people from 33 chapters met in Los Angeles. The structure adopted favored decentralization, with locals given the autonomy necessary to tailor programs according to respective community needs. The membership would set programs and policies at an annual convention. A National Steering Committee would coordinate resources and act as the voice for US-China Friendship at a national level. The Committee was elected each year by the convention, and had representatives from the regions. William Hinton was elected the first chairman.



*Left: Koji Ariyoshi. Above: Esther Gollobin. Top: Bill Hinton.*





Right: Victor Sidel with Zhou Enlai. Above: David Crook.



## Learning By Hugh Deane

The New York Chapter, now in its 14th year, has a record of successful efforts and wrong turns, as indeed does the USCPFA as a whole. I think we should pay most attention to where we went wrong and learn from that, and I think a pervasive fault on the part of leading members, including me, was a credulous view of China. We glorified it.

Visiting China, we toured the equivalent of Potemkin villages and took seriously inflated statistics and sweeping rhetoric. Now many of those who believed all was well in China have swung to the opposite extreme and see a counter-revolution in the making. That notion also is unreal.

If you worst case China, it is indeed moving fast down the wrong road, and if you best case it, you are dreaming. We ought to remind ourselves constantly that the reality is complex. I have just come back from China and was heartened by some of the very rapid changes and disconcerted by others. I think it is premature and even infantile to write China off; its leadership is trying to modernize things and advance living standards in the face of many obstacles, including past mistakes, and the burden of overpopulation.

Friendship with such a striving, imperfect China is worth all our efforts. Friendship between peoples increases the chances of a happy ending and that between our two peoples in particular can be a force for peace.

*Deane, a member of the National Board, has served on the executive committee of the New York Chapter since it was founded in August, 1971.*

## Friendship cont'd

Motivations to create or join a chapter of the USCPFA were as mixed as the composition of the membership. Those sympathetic to socialism saw China as a model for the world and wanted to educate Americans about socialism as an alternative to capitalism. Others wanted the USCPFA to serve as a base for organizing a political party of the left. Former missionaries, former servicemen and others who had lived or worked in China wanted to renew old friendships that had been cut by prolonged estrangement. Anti-war activists wanted good relations with China to prevent conflicts like the one in Vietnam. China scholars wanted to learn more about the PRC and hoped to be able to study there in the future. Traders and businessmen hoped for commercial contacts. Others were simply curious about China and what life there was like.

The majority felt that relations between the two countries had to improve and that the American policy of nonrecognition was wrong. By building friendly relations between the peoples of the two nations, the USCPFA founders hoped to build a grassroots base of Americans who knew about and favored relations with the PRC.

Other chapters sprang up: the Philadelphia chapter was started by young CCAS scholars; Margaret Stanley, a nurse from the AFSC ambulance corps in Yanan; Ida Pruitt, a former missionary worker who had been active with INDUSCO.

The Connecticut Valley chapter was started by Helen Foster Snow, Preston Schoyer of Yale, Laurence Salisbury and John Hersey.

Koji Ariyoshi, who had been tried during the 1950s for violations of the Smith Act, founded the USCPFA chapter in Honolulu and served on the National Steering Committee until his death in 1978.

Activists and organizers of the chapter received visas and invitations to visit the PRC. By early 1972, four delegations from chapters across the country had traveled to China. They met with cadres, toured communes and factories and saw developments there. The activists spent weeks after their return lecturing and showing slides to curious audiences who besieged them with questions.

Interest in these talks increased membership and new chapters were formed.

For the USCPFA, these efforts grew into a large-scale public education program. One study of USCPFA contacts showed that one and a half million people had been contacted by USCPFA activities—lectures, slide shows, exhibitions, celebrations, publications and tours—in one year.

The state-to-state arrangements were covered in the Sino-US Joint Accord which Nixon and Zhou Enlai signed during Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972. The Accord, most often referred to as the Shanghai Communique, formed the official basis for Sino-US relations until Normalization occurred in January 1979.

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## Friendship cont'd

From the beginning, the Chinese had welcomed the idea of relations with the US although they could not accept the terms the Americans imposed on Taiwan. The Chinese "wanted to be free of the military harness that the US has thrown around East Asia since the Korean War" and wanted to reduce the threat of American invasion from Vietnam. Mao Zedong, in a talk with Edgar Snow, indicated his belief that he could work with Richard Nixon, whom Mao saw as the representative of the ruling class; if Nixon were to make a move, the move would be accepted by that class, and was not likely to be reversed by a future administration. Mao believed the US would have to make overtures to China, since America had been defeated in Vietnam. Defeat meant a reconsideration of Asian policy was due. Although unsure as to what real accomplishments could be made, Mao expected some good to come from Nixon's visit.

Nixon's announcement of the secret negotiations on relations with the PRC broke the back of resistance against its admission to the United Nations. The PRC won a seat there in October 1971 and the Nationalists were expelled. No NATO ally supported the United States effort to cling to dual representation. Success in the United Nations and with the US sparked a flurry of activities by nations eager to do business with the Chinese. The Canton Trade Fair that year brought 10,000 businessmen from 50 nations to China on business.

The future of Taiwan was still the chief obstacle to smooth relations. Nixon would not retreat from military and economic ties to Taiwan. He was joined by some China scholars, officials in government, professors, experts and others who devised different schemes to keep some form of relations with Taiwan while recognizing the PRC.

China's position was immutable. As Zhou Enlai told the CCAS group, the PRC held to six points: (1) the PRC is the sole legitimate government of the Chinese people; (2) Taiwan is a province of China, an inalienable part of China's territory; (3) Taiwan's status is clear, not unsettled, not to

be determined by any international organization; (4) the PRC will not accept any version of the two-China policy or the one-China, one-Taiwan plan; (5) the Taiwanese independence movement is to be opposed, since the people on Taiwan are Chinese and the independence movement is foreign-inspired; and (6) the US has to withdraw forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

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### The US-China Peoples Friendship Association

By the time the US-China People's Friendship Association (USCPFA) got started in mid-1971, it looked as though diplomatic relations with China were imminent. US-CPFA's obvious tasks were to reinforce progress, build ties with the Chinese people, educate the American public about the PRC and American policy toward the PRC and Taiwan.

The idea of a "friendship association" with the PRC was not uniquely American. The Chinese had not enjoyed diplomatic relations with many nations at the beginning of their existence and had been deliberately excluded from organizations such as the United Nations that enhanced international contacts. In addition, factual knowledge about the PRC was scanty or, as in America, distorted for political purposes. Therefore, citizens of most nations with relations with the PRC, or citizens who wanted their nation to initiate diplomatic relations with the PRC had reason to form "friendship associations."

These associations were handled by the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (YOUXIE), a division of the PRC Foreign Ministry. Friendship associations took different forms in different nations; some were quasi-official bodies funded by the government; others received some public funding; while others existed as private membership organizations.

In any case, an Association interprets and explains China's policies and positions accurately, without endorsing them. YOUXIE prefers that all associations be open to anyone friendly to China, not just the left; "China needs everybody," as Wang Bingnan, the head of YOUXIE put it, during a 1979 visit.



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The first American association was started in San Francisco in the spring of 1971. The second branch was established in Los Angeles shortly thereafter. One of the founders of the West Coast chapters was Frank Pestana, an attorney who had traveled to the PRC in 1959 as the guest of a PRC official who had been his roommate in college.

Pestana had spent the following years lecturing about the PRC throughout California. The individuals he had come to know on these speaking tours formed the founding group of the Los Angeles chapter. They were joined by young Asian scholars, members of the Revolutionary Union and others interested in China.

Susan Warren, writer and former editor of CDFEP's *Far East Spotlight*, organized a New York Friendship Association in August 1971, shortly after the San Francisco group was started. She was joined by Mei Zeqiang, one of the leaders of the overseas Chinese community in New York and by former CDFEP activists including Hugh Deane, Maud Russell and Ira Gollobin. Individuals with a long-term interest in China were also part of the organizing committee and among these were Helen and Sam Rosen, Charles Coe and others.

Young activists from left or progressive groups, like the Young Lords, SDS, CCAS, the Revolutionary Union and former Peace Corps workers also joined.

The USCPFA grew rapidly and became a mass organization. By the late 1970s, it had 110 chapters in the US and a membership close to 11,000.

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A national USCPFA publication, *New China*, was approved, to be a popular, educational magazine about China. Several campaigns for improved relations were approved: outreach, which would coordinate the educational aspects of the Association while recruiting workers and minorities into the membership; an Olympics committee, to obtain PRC entry into the Games; and normalization, to speed implementation of the Shanghai Communique and to battle those factions opposed to recognition of the PRC.

The USCPFA Statement of Principles was hammered out at this convention. The goal of the USCPFA was to build friendship "based on mutual understanding between the people" of the two countries. The USCPFA urged "full diplomatic, trade and cultural relations" with China according to the terms set forth in the Communique.

The Statement agreed that US recognition of and military presence in Taiwan was an obstacle to relations and said: "Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the resolution of the Taiwan question is an internal affair of China. We recognize that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China." Anyone who agreed with the statement and who wanted to improve relations with China, could join the Association.

As the Statement of Principles indicates, the USCPFA intended to campaign for normalization on terms that excluded US diplomatic involvement in Taiwan. Members agreed that US interests would be better served in the long run by severing diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC as the only government in China. The Chinese had stated that fruitful relations would only occur when US recognition of Taiwan had ceased and the USCPFA accepted these terms.

Young activists in the Association, many of whom had experienced bitter confrontations with officials in civil rights and anti-war protests, objected to working with elected figures. They distrusted political officials, believing that most had lied to the public about the war and Watergate. Certain of these activists accepted the "Bombard-the-headquarters-overthrow-the-Bourgeoisie" slogans of the Red Guards. Therefore, the best way to force a complete and lasting change in policy was to mobilize the



*John S. Service greets YOUXIE's Wang Bingnan in 1979.*

masses to call for normalization. These activists preferred to work on educational programs and challenged efforts to include, or lobby, elected officials. Consequently, the committees set up to plan programs for normalization work that operated on the local, regional and national level were beset by internal disagreements over projects and the allocation of resources. These struggles sapped the energy of the volunteer workers and interfered with the Association's ability to develop a unified, comprehensive strategy on normalization activities.

The uneven nature of USCPFA's work on normalization was hampered by the uncertain direction of US policy-makers. When Gerald Ford became president in 1974 activists hoped that normalization would finally occur, but Ford failed to act. He did speak for normalization, and he visited China in December 1975, where he "reaffirmed the determination of the United States to complete normalization." No declaration, no communique, no advances came from his visit and many declared it a failure.

Ford later reduced US troops on Taiwan by half, and in April 1976, sent a telegram

to Premier Hua Guofeng, stating American determination to complete normalization.

The USCPFA rallied demonstrations at the time of Ford's visit to China and sponsored talks about the implications of diplomatic relations. The committees had agreed that normalization would be a topic at the end of each presentation; some committees had also commemorated the signing of the Shanghai Communique that February.

Without diplomatic relations with the PRC, American contacts and investments in Taiwan soared. As Professor Paul Lin of McGill University wrote in 1975:

Since 1973, through the use of long-term, low-interest credits, US arms sales to Taiwan have nearly doubled, going from \$45.2 million two years ago to \$80 million for this fiscal year. Taiwan has also purchased several American submarines, destroyers and fleet support ships... American trade with Taiwan has increased from \$1.5 billion in 1971, shortly before Nixon's visit, to \$3.7 billion last year... American investment on Taiwan has expanded, with new projects

by such corporations as Ford Motor Company and Union Carbide. The Export-Import Bank recently gave the island a loan for the construction of two nuclear power plants and several American companies are exploring for oil in the Taiwan Straits... Since the signing of the Shanghai Communique, the United States has also allowed the Chiang regime to set up five new consulates... The amount of US investment is immense, nearly \$500 million by 1974... private and public loans to Taiwan [from 1972-75] total \$2.5 billion... Taiwan is the most favored of the manufacturing and assembly centers that US corporate enterprise has established abroad to take advantage of cheap labor, a ban on strikes, tax advantages, profit remittance rights and other conditions.

Corporations, banks and the Nationalists began to lobby Congress and the executive to keep Taiwan available for their investments. Businessmen on Taiwan did not want normalization if it would jeopardize their commercial relations. Corporate executives had thought the PRC would offer trade advantages but had cooled to the idea after the Chinese reduced trade when normalization did not occur.

Many who desired normalization were puzzled and angered by the growing contradiction in American policy toward China. One of the most outspoken critics was Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who spoke to Congress about the build-up of Taiwan:

All this hardly adds up to carrying out the obvious intent of the Shanghai Communique which anticipated our military disengagement from Taiwan and the Chinese civil war... It is in this nation's interest to bring our military posture in the Taiwan area into accord with the Nixon-Zhou agreement of 1972... We cannot strengthen our ties with a claimant government of China in Taiwan and, at the same time, expect to advance a new relationship with the government of the People's Republic of China. The Shanghai Communique was designed as a transitional arrangement; it did not predicate an indefinite ambivalence in our China policy... As for our defense treaty with Taiwan, it seems to me that it is properly seen as a relic of the past... We must match our commitments to our contemporary interests.

William Hinton, disappointed at the laxity of the government officials and concerned about the emphasis on Taiwan, pressed for more substantial work on normalization. In December 1975, he organized a conference on normalization for the East Coast chapters. Pamphlets, educational kits, posters and other materials explaining normalization were designed and distributed at the conference. Four other regional conferences were held over the next six months to improve the uneven work the locals had been doing on the question and to provide them with materials and information they could use in their presentations to community groups.

The USCPFA sponsored a national conference on normalization in December 1976. It was co-sponsored by FCNL, AFSC, CCAS, the Methodist Federation for Social Action, the National Lawyers Guild and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, among others. Nearly 400 delegates attended and discussed the urgency of relations with the PRC. The USCPFA agreed with the PRC position regarding Taiwan and encouraged other organizations to explain these positions to their members and to transmit their feelings to president-elect Carter and to Congress.

To counter sentiment about Taiwan's future ties with the US, USCPFA chapters prepared a fact sheet on Taiwan, to provide audiences with information about its status and life there. The fact sheet noted that Taiwan had been a part of China longer than the US had existed and that the government on Taiwan had been created by and kept in power by the US government: "Despite talk of Taiwan's being an economic miracle and a democratic ally, the Chiang regime is an oppressive dictatorship... For the vast majority on Taiwan, the Chiang regime has meant wages of 10¢-40¢ an hour, no-strike laws and government-controlled unions."

The fact sheet explained China's position that Taiwan was an internal question for the Chinese and predicted that life after reunification would be better for the residents of Taiwan than their status under the Chiang regime. The Association also printed a pamphlet, *Taiwan: Roadblock to Friendship*, reprints of articles by Paul Lin and John S. Service on US-Taiwan ties, and leaflets on conditions for normalization. All were nationally distributed through the local chapters.

*Continued next page*

Paul Lin



Felix Greene



## Friendship cont'd

### The Carter Administration's policy

The direction of the Carter foreign policy regarding China was not immediately clear. Although he reiterated America's commitment to normalization of relations with China, Carter stressed the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan matter, in such a manner as to make it seem a precondition. Relations with China had a low priority for Carter.

The USCPFA was also extremely disappointed by the failure of the Carter Administration to complete normalization. Members attending the annual convention that September voted to establish a Center for US-China Relations in Washington DC. The Center would monitor debates in Congress, follow legislation or other activities related to China and be a resource of information for local and regional normalization workers.

The National Normalization Committee met in November to map strategies that would improve the work at the grass-roots level and supplement the actions planned for the Center. The National, noting the upcoming exchanges the USCPFA was sponsoring with China—a month-long tour by the Chinese soccer team and a three-month long tour of paintings done by peasants from Hushien county—decided to use these events a focal points for normalization activities. Information would be distributed to everyone attending these events.

Activities in public education and normalization were helped by the extensive tours program the USCPFA mounted in 1977. Prior to 1977, the Association had been booking frequent tours to China, mostly for volunteer workers with the Association or for specialists who were interested in studying Chinese society. The Association became one of the few organizations with large bookings to the PRC.

By early 1978, it was obvious that the Carter Administration had not produced a satisfactory explanation to delay normalization further. Objective conditions for normalization looked bright. The United States' trade with the PRC had jumped to more than \$1 billion in 1977 and the ambitious plans to modernize China promised more commercial activity.

American firms had been talking with PRC officials about hotels and other tourist facilities, off-shore oil exploration, agricultural machinery and communications equipment. Japan had worked out arrangements to keep its commercial relations with Taiwan intact after it recognized the PRC and it seemed likely that the US could negotiate a similar accord, if it broke diplomatic and military ties to Taiwan.

To spur some action, the USCPFA made a major effort to turn out demonstrators at the February rallies celebrating the Shanghai Communique. Joined by the major overseas Chinese organizations, the USCPFA took out ads in the largest newspapers with national distribution, calling upon the Carter Administration to normalize relations with the PRC at once. The ads noted that the US was the only world power to retain diplomatic ties with Taiwan and US-PRC relations would bring benefits to both nations. The ads quoted Senator Edward Kennedy and other high officials, including Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott, who had said that normalization, "even at the expense of severing diplomatic ties with friends," should occur quickly.

Signals that the Administration had finally decided to act came in May 1978, when Brzezinski and a party of American officials went to China. They met with Chairman Hua Guofeng, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Huang Hua. In a speech, Brzezinski said that US friend-

ship with China was "based on shared concerns and is derived from a long-term strategic view... We recognize and share China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global and regional hegemony."

Brzezinski also said that the shared views "clearly outweighed" the differences and announced that the US had made up its mind to overcome any obstacles remaining in the path of full relations. Final deliberations on normalization were begun on this trip.

Carter announced the fulfillment of efforts on December 15, 1978. The United States and the PRC would establish relations on January 1, 1979. The US would sever diplomatic ties with the Republic of China as of that date and announce a termination of the mutual defense treaty. Commercial, cultural and other relations short of official diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan would be permitted. While reserving an interest in the peaceful settlement of Taiwan, the US acknowledged that Taiwan's future was a matter for the Chinese to decide among themselves.

USCPFA activists were among the many who rejoiced at the news. The efforts of some had spanned three decades and the accomplishment was sweet. Although not completely certain as to exactly how their efforts had brought about the final announcement, most felt the Association had played a positive role in this worthy struggle.

*Continued next page*

*Dr. Han Suyin*





### Conclusions

The USCPFA is the largest group that worked for recognition. The 10,000 members it eventually attracted included citizens from different regional, economic and ethnic backgrounds. The early members came from the left, from progressive groups and from anti-establishment organizations. As interest in China grew, USCPFA attracted many people who were sympathetic to or simply curious about China. The USCPFA became a mass organization, in contrast to the National Committee on US-China Relations.

The USCPFA's activities were conducted by volunteers from 1971-77, when a small staff was hired at the national level. Volunteers organized the chapters, did their own fundraising and contributed their own time and finances to sustain the work. Some of the founders have been unflagging in their efforts to achieve normalization. Many people devoted much time and energy to a matter of foreign policy when few material rewards were forthcoming.

Public education was a major accomplishment of the USCPFA. Hundreds of volunteers taught and talked to Americans about China and this activity was a constant task performed by USCPFA members. USCPFA slide shows, courses, trips, publications and exchanges with the PRC did bring a new perspective on China to thousands of Americans. USCPFA did provide a positive environment for normalization.

USCPFA took advantage of the progress toward normalization in the 1970s by approving the likeliest terms of normalization and working for them. The National Committee on US-China Relations had faced

different circumstances in the 1960s and had adopted a more cautious, non-partisan position in order to advance debate on the issue. The USCPFA decided to campaign for specific terms as a way of countering those individuals and groups who wanted the US to maintain a presence in Taiwan.

The USCPFA supported the options the PRC held since it was unlikely that normalization would ever occur unless the US broke relations with the Nationalists.

The USCPFA position proved to be the realistic one, but it earned the organization a reputation in some quarters of being pro-PRC and pro-Left.

The stand on Taiwan led some USCPFA activists to believe they could not work with other organizations who favored some form of official ties between the US and the Nationalists. This hindered cooperative endeavors that could have been arranged, e.g., joint co-sponsorship of exchanges with the National Committee on US-China Relations.

Too, USCPFA members found it difficult to educate people about the PRC's rationale for its positions and the need for the US to sever ties with Taiwan because the other viewpoint was widely promulgated by officials, some Asian experts, Congress and business circles.

The talks, tours and exchanges the USCPFA sponsored with the PRC were positive examples of the good relations that normalization would bring. The PRC revealed its commitment to improved relations by dispatching thousands of visas to the USCPFA, scheduling educational trips for activists and carefully planning itineraries and exchanges. □